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Abstract
In 1970 the external debt of Tanzania, a least developed country, was 16.8 per cent of GDP and
58.6 per cent of exports. The ratio of per capita debt to per capita income was 14.4 per cent. By
2001 the debt had reached just over 100 per cent of GDP and over 11 times the value of exports,
with a per capita debt to per capita income ratio of 102 per cent. By any wisdom this is a
terrifying story. Efforts to address the debt burden have involved own initiatives and global
initiatives, the latest being the enhanced HIPC Initiative.
What are the new prospects? This paper attempts to assess the potency of the HIPC Initiative in
addressing the key agenda items in Tanzania: poverty reduction/eradication and resolving the
external debt burden. The assessment involves analysing long-term trends in debt build-up and
debt servicing obligations as well as Tanzania’s efforts in order to become eligible for the
enhanced initiative, though still attempting to achieve the completion point at over 16 months after
reaching the decision point.
The main conclusions are that relief comes too late to address adverse impacts and is too little to
meet poverty targets. This calls on Tanzania to concentrate on complementary measures and the
HIPC Initiative to undergo refinements like addressing the time lag between decision and
completion points, and incorporating ratio of recurrent expenditure as a threshold level.
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If in year 2000, Tanzanians (totalling 31.9 million) decided
... to starve themselves to death in order to pay off their
external debt, they would succeed in paying about 78 per
cent debt burden. They would all go in their graves with an
unpaid debt of nearly US$  57 per capita. That kind of
poverty cannot pay off that kind of debt.
Mwalimu Nyerere (1999)
1 Introduction: the ugly side of debt, global concerns
and build-up to new hopes
Excessive (or unsustained) external indebtedness at the country level is undesired for
a number of reasons: it crowds out the effects of new aid, it undermines the credibility
of policies being pursued, it signals a weak economy while high debt service
obligations constrain the country’s ability to pursue development programmes and it
curtails social spending, as much needed resources are being diverted into debt
servicing.
The plight of countries which have become to be known as the highly indebted poor
countries (HIPCs), originally 41 in number (of which 33, or 80 per cent are in Africa)
has dominated global debates since September 1996 when the IMF/World Bank-
initiated HIPC Initiative was put in place. The HIPC Initiative was to be as a novel
proposal to complement traditional debt relief arrangements which were thought to be
insufficient. The debt burden of these countries has become the concern of not only
economics or politics, but also of the civil society. Increased pressure to refine the
original HIPC programme led to the Enhanced HIPC Initiative (HIPC II) with less
onerous conditions and more accommodating definitions such as the ratio of debt to
exports of 150 per cent or more versus the 200-250 per cent stipulated in the original
programme. One of the outcomes of this refinement was a rapid growth in the number
of qualifiers. For example, between 1996 and 1998 only two countries (Bolivia and
Uganda) had qualified, but by year 2000-end, a further 20 countries had qualified with
‘decision point’ status. The HIPC Initiative also brought ‘new hope’—as a condition
for eligibility, the IMF and World Bank require that countries craft national
development policies into a form of poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs) to
ensure that money ‘saved’ from the relief would be spent on social services. In many
HIPCs where economic literacy is low, the relief has been misconstrued to mean
cancellation and politicians are reaping dividends.
HIPC II has not been spared criticism from the civil society and some quarters within
debtor countries that the effort is still insufficient to address the debt burden. What is
the truth?
This paper attempts an assessment of the HIPC initiative framework in addressing the
external debt concerns of Tanzania, a country which has reached decision point (April
2000) but not completion point yet (probably by 2001-end). The attempt is made
against the backdrop of poverty reduction priority by both the country and the
initiative, with a view to assessing the likelihood of meeting poverty reduction targets.2
The paper is organized into six sections, including the brief introduction. Section 2
presents a brief profile of the debt problem in Tanzania while section 3 presents the
cost of debt servicing to the economy. Section 4 surveys pre-HIPC initiatives to
address the debt burden. Cost-benefit considerations are the subject of section five
while the last section being devoted to concluding remarks.
2 The debt profile of Tanzania
In this section we present Tanzania’s debt profile,1 with section 2.1 detailing the
current status and section 2.2 reviews its evolution over time.
2.1 Current status of Tanzania’s external debt
As of May 2001 (latest available data) total external debt stock stood at US$ 7,508.3
million, being disbursed outstanding debt plus interest arrears. Interest arrears alone
stood at US$ 1,142.5 million. The total debt stock is close to 100 per cent of GDP and
11 times annual exports. This compares unfavourable to for example 1970 when the
debt stock was only US$ 196 million (16.8 per cent of GDP and 58.6 per cent of
exports). Between 1970 and 2000 the debt stock grew by 45 times from US$ 8.8
billion.
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1The discussion will only centre on external debt. Domestic debt, as of May 2001 stood at TShs
23.5 billion (approximately US$ 0.03 billion), being principal and interest.3
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Table 1
Outstanding debt by economic sectors in Tanzania, May 2001
%
Balance-of-payments support 24.4
Transport and telecommunications 16.3
Agriculture 15.7
Energy and mining 12.9
Industry 6.5
Social welfare and education 5.1
Finance and insurance 2.1
Tourism 1.3
Other sectors 15.7
Source: Bank of Tanzania (2001).
Debt owed to multilateral creditors made up 55.8 per cent while bilateral debt 36.5 per
cent. Commercial sources and other private creditors accounted for 4.9 per cent and
2.8 per cent, respectively. The largest borrower is the central government, accounting
for 92.6 per cent of the total disbursed outstanding debt, followed by the private sector
(4.7 per cent) and public corporations (2.7 per cent).
The structure of debt by economic sectors is shown in Table 1. This structure has
remained more or unless unchanged since the country started experiencing difficulties
in servicing its debt (Mjema and Kilindo 2001).
During May 2001, no new loans were contracted by the government. Disbursements
amounted to US$ 19.8 million while debt service payments claimed US$ 20.1 million
leading to a net outflow of US$ 0.3 million. In the first closing of debt buy-back
scheme on 6th June 2001, US$  155.7 million were retired, being principal and
interest.
The structure of Tanzania’s external debt shows two distinct features which need to
be highlighted here. First, the large size of the balance-of-payments support shows4
that the country has foreign exchange problems. This is the category of borrowing to
cater for the import bill and to cover government deficit. Agriculture, the leading
foreign exchange earner and main source of GDP (see Appendix 1) was third in the
priority list. Second, the government, being such a large borrower (in relation to the
private sector indicates control of economic activities by the government.
2.2 Evolution of external debt burden over time
Table 2 shows the evolution of external debt for the past three decades comparing its
growth rate with that of gross domestic product (GDP), exports and imports.
A casual observation of long-term trends of debt and GDP growth rates shows a high
rate of debt from 1971 to 1980 associated with a relatively low GDP growth. The
subperiod 1981-84 shows even much lower GDP growth rates, whereas GDP growth
Table 2
 Growth rate of debt, exports, imports and GDP in Tanzania, 1970-2000
Growth rates (%) of
Year Debt Exports Imports GDP
1970 - 0.5 30.5 5.6
1971 22.9 1.7 4.3 4.1
1972 22.9 9.3 5.8 6.7
1973 26.8 1.3 9.9 3.0
1974 43.1 -5.9 28.8 2.5
1975 29.5 -23.2 -15.7 9.4
1976 42.0 26.9 -12.1 2.9
1977 32.7 5.5 3.1 0.3
1978 12.1 -27.4 27.7 2.1
1979 10.0 6.9 -9.3 2.4
1980 12.7 -28.6 -12.7 4.5
1981 7.6 -9.9 -18.6 0.0
1982 9.3 -32.3 -33.2 0.5
1983 10.6 -20.8 16.0 -2.3
1984 2.9 7.0 -4.0 3.3
1985 13.0 -24.7 47.5 4.5
1986 14.0 36.2 73.6 1.8
1987 19.7 34.8 15.0 4.9
1988 5.1 29.1 0.0 4.0
1989 -1.0 42.8 37.7 3.9
1990 14.5 2.4 5.0 5.0
1991 17.0 5.3 8.3 6.0
1992 1.7 10.1 -7.5 4.0
1993 1.6 34.0 19.5 4.0
1994 7.9 25.0 -0.1 3.0
1995 5.3 35.0 18.1 3.6
1996 -5.9 2.8 -5.2 4.5
1997 -1.1 -4.2 -4.0 3.5
1998 3.0 -9.7 20.9 4.0
1999 11.0 5.0 3.0 4.7
2000 8.6 21.8 -2.4 4.95
rate is relatively high and stable after 1986, the year of adopting ‘true’ reforms while
growth rate of debt has been fluctuating. It should be pointed out that because of the
small base of exports, they have not been able to offset both debt and import growth
rates.
2.3 Factors explaining debt accumulation in Tanzania
There is general agreement that difficulties in meeting external debt service
obligations result from both external and domestic factors (Kilindo 1993; BOT 1995;
URT 1999; Boote and Thugge 1999). These are detailed below.
2.3.1 Domestic factors
Domestic factors include:
−   Bad policies pursued in the past by the government that contributed to excessive
growth of aggregate demand unmatched by increased production (BOT 1995)
(excessive emphasis on industry at the expense of agriculture, fast growing
administration, the fastest in the 1970s), etc.
−   Inappropriate macroeconomic policies (fiscal imprudence, mismanagement of
exchange rate and currency composition);
−   Economic mismanagement (consumptive spending, lack of accountability); and
−   Lack of prudent debt management policies (no proper policy and institutional
framework, low negotiating and analytical capacity, low commitment to debt
issues, etc.). Even the national debt strategy for external debt which became
operational in 1998/99 is weak with regard to legal framework and coordination.
2.3.2External factors
The combination of external factors involved elements such as:
−   Lending policies of creditors, e.g. short repayment periods;
−   External shocks (1973/4 and 1979/0 oil price increases, worsening terms of trade
since the mid-1970s, break-up of the East African community in 1977, war with
Idi Amin’s Uganda in 1978 which cost the equivalent of a year’s exports in direct
war-related expenses, adverse weather conditions such as droughts, floods);
−   General decline in donor financing in the early 1990s; and
−   Increasing interest rate in proportion to concessional debt (for loans with variable
interest rates) especially after 1986.
The interplay of these factors made Tanzania unable to meet fully its debt servicing
obligations. Boote and Thugge (1999) show Tanzania’s ‘default’ rate to be as high as
around 70 per cent between 1990 and 1994, while Danielson and Mjema (2001) show
an average default rate of 55 per cent between 1994 and year 2000.6
3 The cost of debt servicing to Tanzania’s economy
This section presents a brief overview of Tanzania’s debt burden. The discussion
centres on the 1990s which represent years of ‘staying the course’ of reforms.
Comparison of debt service (expenditures) is made against total government
spending, exports and social spending.
3.1 Debt service compared to total expenditure and exports
Table 3 shows actual expenditures on debt service as proportion of exports and total
government recurrent spending. Highest proportions are experienced between 1990/1
and 1993/4 with respect to exports while in comparison to total government recurrent
expenditure the average has exceeded 20 per cent for most years.
Table 3
 Debt service compared with government spending and exports in Tanzania, 1990-2001 (%)
Debt service compared to












Source: BOT (1996) and computations from URT (2001b).
3.2 Debt service as multiple of social spending
A comparison of government recurrent expenditure on education and health, for
example, reveals the extent of ‘deprivation’ is shown in Table 4.
Table 4












Source: Computations from URT (2001b).7
Table 4 reveals that debt servicing claimed more of the government’s recurrent
expenditure than spending for both education and health throughout the period
1990-2000. Highest multiples are experienced between 1996/7 and 1998/9. Given the
situation in social services and poverty in general (see appendix 2), such a pattern ‘is a
violation of fundamental human rights’(Ecumenical Coalition for Economic Justice
2001) since scarce resources are sacrificed to debt payments instead of meeting the
basic needs of the people. Vandemoortele (2001: 45) describes the commitment of the
governments in Sub-Saharan Africa:
… governments spend about twice as much to comply with their
financial commitments vis-a-vis external creditors than to comply with
their social obligations vis-a-vis the people. To spend more on external
debt than on basic social services-when tens of millions of children
lack access to basic education, primary health, adequate food and safe
drinking water—is not only morally wrong, it is poor economics.
Tanzania is spending more than four times!
URT (1999) simulates the effect of a 10-per cent cap on government revenue going to
external debt service would mean in terms of savings and social impact: (i) doubling
primary education recurrent budget; (ii) doubling primary health care recurrent
budget; and (iii)increasing gross enrolment in primary education by 15 per cent.
These are by no means small impacts. Next, we look at the build-up to the HIPC
eligibility.
4 Tanzania’s build up to the HIPC process and consequent ‘cost’
Since the adoption of the economic recovery programme in 1986, Tanzania has stayed
on the course of reforms, pursuing strong economic adjustment policies and good
governance. With a good track record, and having policies in place that promote
sustainable growth and aim at poverty eradication, the country became eligible for
HIPC relief on 4 April 2000. This section addresses issues that relate to external debt
and discusses the sacrifices Tanzania had to make to reach this path.
4.1 Early attempts to address the external debt burden in Tanzania
Tanzania has participated in all global debt reduction initiatives as well as home-
grown schemes.
Global initiatives:
−   The Baker Plan (initiated in 1985) for rescheduling debts. No benefits for
Tanzania, save for postponing the crisis;
−   The Brady Plan (1989) for the cancellation of debts. No tangible achievements for
Tanzania;8
−   Bilateral debt relief initiatives: Tanzania has actively used these initiatives since
the debt crisis unfolded in the mid 1970s. As a result of such efforts, US$ 1,044
million in debt was cancelled between 1978 and 1997;
−   Paris Club Debt Relief for rescheduling and cancellation: After participating five
times, Tanzania realized a debt cancellation worth US$ 594.9 million and debt
rescheduling worth US$ 2.105 billion.
‘Home-grown’ initiatives:
−   Debt conversion programme (DCP): In 1990 Tanzania opted for a limited DCP.
By 1993 debts worth US$  182.0 million had been converted and proceeds
reinvested, but on grounds of fuelling inflation, the scheme was terminated;
−   Debt buy-back scheme: This replaced the DCP. Upon reinstatement of IMF
enhanced structural adjustment facility (ESAF) in November 1996 (after
suspension between 1994/5 and 1995/6) debts worth US$  253 million were
subjected under this scheme;
−   Poverty reduction balance support (PRBS): The genesis of this facility can be
traced to an earlier facility, the multilateral debt relief fund (MDF) which became
operational in 1997 with counterpart funds targeted to education and health
sectors. By the end of year 2000, contributions had reached US$ 120 million, from
Denmark, Finland, Ireland, UK, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland.
The poverty reduction balance support is more flexible than MDF, is independent
of debt service obligations and is supportive of the government’s poverty
reduction strategies.
4.2 The HIPC relief and Tanzania’s chase for completion point
Earlier arrangements on easing Tanzania’s debt burden were insufficient in volume
(compared to the debt size) and excluded the multilateral component which has been
quite significant in Tanzania, making up for example 55.8 per cent of total debt in
May 2001. The HIPC Initiative was thus much welcome for raising the prospect of
cancelling multilateral debt. For details of the initiative, see for example Boote and
Thugge (1999) and UNRISD (2000).
Upon satisfactory fulfilment of all attendant conditions, Tanzania is expected to
benefit through the various relief measures, as detailed below.
4.2.1. Additional resources:
−   Interim relief from the IMF and World Bank during 1999/2000 of about US$ 0.01
billion;
−   Phase I (2001-2003) IMF US$ 17.97 million and IDA (World Bank) US$ 37.5
million;
−   Phase II (final decision point after fulfilling the conditions in Phase I) IMF
US$ 152 million in total for next ten years and IDA US$ 1.2 billion in total for
next twenty years.9
This brings a total of US$ 100 million annually from the multilateral creditors.
4.2.2‘Smaller’ debt and ‘lighter’ debt service burden:
The outlook of the debt burden is presented in Table 5.
Table 5
 Implications of HIPC debt relief to Tanzania 2000/01 to 2006/07 (US$)
2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07
NPV before rescheduling
US$ billion 4.8 4.9 5.1 5.2 5.4 5.6 5.8
NPV after HIPC, US$ billion 2.7 2.4 2.6 2.8 3.0 3.3 3.5
Gain US$ billion 2.1 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.3
Debt service ratio
After HIPC, US$ million 11.9 9.5 8.4 7.8 7.3 7.0 7.0
Of which multilateral 4.7 2.7 2.0 2.7 3.0 2.7 2.3
Before HIPC 24.6 20.9 25.6 13.7 12.5 - -
Source: Bank of Tanzania.
4.2.3 Good gesture from bilateral creditors
By reaching the completion point bilateral creditors are also expected to make more
concessions.
4.3 The cost of HIPC qualification
In the process of eligibility, Tanzania has had to bear the following costs:
−   Producing the poverty reduction strategy paper (PRSP) when the national poverty
eradication strategy (NPES) was already in place. By all definitions NPES is more
comprehensive. The process that guided NPES (1999) was replicated by PRSP
(2000) with only one year apart with an interim report, zonal workshops, etc.
Resources used in PRSP preparation (at around US$ 0.3 million) could have gone
a long way towards funding social services, e.g. enough to pay for costs of 5,000
primary school pupils;
−   The long negotiation process, taxing both the financial and human capacity time-
wise;
−   More allocation to debt service, more to social spending, crowding out productive
sectors as completion point is being chased;
−   An analysis of monthly allocation of recurrent expenditure in the critical period
(after decision point) shows an increased allocation to debt service and social
services at the expense of productive sectors. For example, comparing July 2000
and July 2001 expenditures on external debt service shows that they rose from
12.5 per cent of monthly recurrent expenditure to 20.2 per cent. The
corresponding ratios for social services are 10.2 per cent and 34.2 per cent,
respectively, bringing a net ‘crowding-out of other sectors by 31.7 per cent with
the productive and economic services sectors experiencing a fall of about 7 per
cent (administration and security by 14 per cent);10
−   Other costs: These include indirect costs and minor direct costs such as the
requirement to publish monthly recurrent expenditures in newspapers;
−   The long span between decision point and completion point: Uganda reached
completion point within 12 months. A long wait breeds uncertainties and probable
excessive austerity to show allegiance to the benchmarks. The relief has to be
accelerated.
5 HIPC: too little too late
In this section we make a brief assessment of the HIPC relief. First we compare the
expected relief with what it actually translates to, then we compare the relief with
necessary expenditures in meeting poverty reduction strategies while the last looks at
the timing of the relief.
5.1 Expected HIPC relief versus actual relief (net relief)
Table 6 compares pre-HIPC and post HIPC Initiative external debt service in
Tanzania. The information in Table 6 needs to be complemented with what Tanzania
has been able to pay in the past. Between 1995/6 and 2000/01, Tanzania paid an
average of US$ 208.5 million annually (equivalent to 45 per cent of required servicing
of US$ 623.3 million annually). With HIPC relief (2001/02 to 2004/05) Tanzania will
pay an annual average of US$ 155 million, showing a relief of US$ 468.3 million
annually. However since Tanzania was paying US$ 208.5 million annually, the actual
relief is the difference (US$  468.3 million less US$  208.5 million)  which yields
US$ 259.8 million only instead of the drummed-up US$ 468.3 million. It is thus little
compared to what it is believed to be.
The question that remains is what happens after the HIPC relief has been delivered,
i.e., what is likely to become of the nice projections based on good performance? As
Danielson and Mjema (2001) point out, Tanzania’s need for exceptional financing
will not disappear despite the HIPC relief. Future projections (IMF/IDA) as cited in
Danielson and Mjema (2001) show higher debt servicing obligations after 2010 than
what Tanzania paid before the HIPC relief!
Table 6
 External debt service in Tanzania, 1995-2018
Pre-HIPC HIPC
1995/6 1996/7 1997/8 1998/9 1999/2000 20000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2004/05 2010-18
Principal 109 127 134 162 131 156
Interest 64 88 84 97 48 51
Total 173 215 218 259 179 207 143 146 155 258
Sources: Bank of Tanzania (official documents), and informed projections.11
5.2 HIPC relief versus meeting international development targets in Tanzania
Tanzania is party to various international development targets. These have been
mainstreamed in Tanzania’s policy and strategy documents (National Poverty
Eradication Strategy, Long-Term Vision 2025, Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
(Mainland); Vision 2020 and Zanzibar Poverty Reduction Plan (Zanzibar)), to cite a
few of the targets: universal primary education by 2015; halving absolute poverty by
2015, etc. Let us, take the target of universal primary education, for example.
ILO/UNCTAD (2000) point to the fact that Tanzania is off-trajectory to achieving this
target. UNESCO (2001) points out that Tanzania has to increase net enrolment by
nearly 47 per cent (or 3 per cent per annum approximately) if it is to reach this target.
By 2000 net enrolment was at 57.1 per cent. The country has to increase classrooms,
learning and teaching materials teachers, etc.
The task involves ‘returning’ Tanzania to the trajectory and sustaining funding levels.
Estimates of primary enrolment (2000) stand at 4.5 million pupils. A 3 per cent annual
increase translates to 135,000 pupils. A decision to double primary enrolment in a
year, for example, requires at a very conservative estimate, T.Shs.156 billion over
1998/99 base. This is equivalent to 57 per cent of the HIPC relief, which is also
needed to meet the requirements of priority items in health, water, rural roads,
agricultural research and extension, HIV/AIDS, etc. (Poverty Reduction Strategy
Paper 2000), thus indicating that the relief is too little to meet poverty reduction
targets.
5.3 HIPC initiative in terms of timing
In order to assess the timing of the initiative, one needs to look at the internationally
recommended debt sustainability levels. These include a debt to GDP ratio of no more
than 50 per cent. For Tanzania, this threshold was crossed in year 1983 and the 100
per cent mark in 1987 (Danielson and Mjema 1996), thus proving that relief has come
too late.
6 Concluding remarks
The HIPC Initiative brought hope to many LDCs suffering from the debt burden.
Perhaps awareness and sensitization have not done enough to expose the hope as
false. The initiative basically enhances the capacity of qualifying countries to reduce
poverty by their own means. HIPC relief is not a panacea for all the ills of the poor
countries—let alone the external debt burden. It remains what it is: a temporary relief
measure that merely postpones the problem. Countries should not put all their eggs in
the HIPC basket, but should rather pursue vigorously pro-poor growth, aggressive
export drive, etc.
The analysis of Tanzania has shown its most acute problem—setting aside current
expenditure funds, on a monthly basis, for external debt servicing. This is what the
initiative should also consider in the equation of debt-servicing burden, ie. threshold
levels, given the low revenue generation capacity of the country (see appendix 1).
Given that the HIPC relief is too little and comes too late, should not the international12
community coin a more effective instrument—such as substantial debt cancellation—
instead of the concept of relief which has dominated development thinking for close
to two decades without any tangible effect on the debt burden of developing countries,
especially the least developed?
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Appendix 1: Selected macroeconomic indicators in Tanzania, 2000
Population, millions 31.9
GDP per capita, US$ 270.0
Real GDP growth, % 4.9
Degree of openness, % 26.7
Agricultural GDP (real), % 48.2
Industrial GDP (broad definition), % 16.9
Manufacturing GDP (real), % 8.3
Inflation rate, % 6.0
Gross domestic savings/GDP, % 2.2
Gross domestic investments/GDP, % 15.5
Foreign reserves, weeks of imports 18
Government revenue/GDP, % 13.1
Government recurrent expenditure/GDP, % 14.4
Development expenditure/GDP, % 4.9
Debt indicators
External debt/GDP, % 100+
External debt/exports, % 1100
Per capita debt/per capita income, % 102
Debt service/exports of goods and services, % 14.9
Debt service/government recurrent expenditure, % 25.6
Sources: Various, as given in the references.15
Appendix 2: Selected poverty indicators in Tanzania, 1999/2000
Portion of population living on less than US$1 a day, % 43
Proportion of under-5 children underweight, % 29.4
Under-5 mortality rate per 1,000 live births 161
Maternal mortality rate per 100,000 live births 529
Net primary school enrolment, % 57.1
Proportion of population using piped water for drinking, % 65.7
Life expectancy,  years 48
Human development index rank 157
Female illiteracy rate, % 45.7
Male illiteracy rate, % 21.2
Infant mortality per 1,000 live births 99
Sources: Data collected from various sources, including UNDP (2000); UN (2001), and Mbelle (2001).